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Saami reindeer herders cooperate with social group members and genetic kin 1 
Abstract 2 
Cooperative behaviors evolve by ultimately increasing the inclusive fitness of performers as well as 3 
recipients of those behaviors. Such increases can occur via direct or indirect fitness benefits, 4 
theoretically explained by reciprocal altruism and kin selection respectively. However, humans are 5 
known for cooperating with individuals who are not necessarily genetic relatives, which seemingly 6 
precludes kin selection as an explanation. Here, we aim to quantify the relative importance of 7 
kinship and social group membership as mediators of cooperative behavior. Using an experimental 8 
gift game, we test whether indigenous Saami reindeer herders in Norway give gifts to genetic 9 
relatives or to members of their cooperative herding group (the ‘siida’), or both. Membership of the 10 
same siida strongly increased the odds of gift-giving. Kinship had a smaller, albeit positive, effect. 11 
Gifts were not preferentially given to younger family members, contrary to predictions relating to 12 
inter-generational resource transfers as a form of parental investment. These patterns suggest that 13 
social grouping can be at least as important as genetic factors in mediating cooperative behavior in 14 
this population. This is likely to reflect the importance of herding groups in day-to-day subsistence. 15 
Key words: humans, cooperation, economic games, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, social groups 16 
Lay Summary 17 
Humans cooperate extensively and flexibly. The extent to which we prefer helping kin over non-kin 18 
(or vice versa) remains an open question. Our experiments with indigenous reindeer herders in 19 
north Norway investigated the relative importance of kin and non-kin in determining cooperative 20 
behavior. Our results suggest that herders give gifts to members of their herding alliances regardless 21 
of whether or not the recipient is a genetic relative, although within groups, kin were favored. 22 
  23 
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Introduction 24 
Cooperation is prevalent in a wide range of taxa, including humans. Cooperative behaviors benefit 25 
other individuals, either at a cost to the cooperator or not; such behaviors can be favored by 26 
selection due to their effects on others (West et al. 2007). The most long-standing explanations of 27 
the evolution of cooperative behavior are kin selection (Hamilton 1964) and reciprocal altruism 28 
(Trivers 1971), both of which are likely to play a role in human social interactions.  A panoply of 29 
theoretical models of these and other effects have shown how the existence of cooperation is 30 
relatively easy to explain in evolutionary terms (Lehmann & Keller 2006; Nowak 2006; West et al. 31 
2007). Ultimately, cooperative behaviors will evolve if they increase the inclusive fitness of the 32 
individuals performing the behavior. Exactly with whom one should cooperate, and to what extent, 33 
remains a contentious issue that is expected to depend on context. 34 
Humans cooperate extensively in many regards. For example, cooperation is vital for survival and 35 
reproduction among humans following a pastoralist way of life: a subsistence strategy involving a 36 
dependence on livestock. Across the world, most pastoralist societies work in cooperative herding 37 
groups formed from multiple families in multiple households (Næss 2012). Ariaal and Rendille 38 
pastoralists of East Africa herd in cooperative units typically formed of siblings’ families that, among 39 
the Ariaal at least, can fission from the wider settlement (Fratkin 1986). In Tibet, the rukor (or ru 40 
skor) is a cooperative group which tends to form for the summer and disband during winter 41 
(Nietupski 2012). Mongolian nomadic herders cluster into groups known as Khot-Ail, living and 42 
managing livestock as a socio-economic unit (Upton 2008). Saami pastoralists, the focus of this 43 
study, work in a cooperative institution known as the siida (Paine 1994). 44 
Working in cooperative groups has many advantages, allowing herders to pool risk, defend herds 45 
from raiders or predators, protect pastureland, share knowledge and information, loan or gift 46 
animals to those in need, and exchange labor (Dyson-Hudson & Dyson-Hudson 1980; Paine 1994; 47 
Aktipis et al. 2011; Næss 2012). These forms of cooperative behavior may be a least-cost strategy 48 
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compared to herding alone, allowing herding groups to achieve economies of scale, i.e. an increase 49 
in the percentage of output coupled with a reduction in the costs related to labor investment (Næss 50 
et al. 2009; Næss 2012).  51 
Kin selection theory (Hamilton 1964) predicts that cooperative behaviors would evolve between 52 
genetic relatives as long as the fitness benefits, tempered by the degree of relatedness between 53 
them, outweigh the costs. Previous work on Saami reindeer pastoralists has shown that decisions to 54 
slaughter are mediated through kin relations (Næss et al. 2012) and that the presence of genetic 55 
relatives, along with the availability of workers, had a positive effect on herd size (Næss et al. 2010). 56 
Such an effect is important for year-on-year household viability as well as during crisis periods; those 57 
with large pre-collapse herd sizes also had the largest post-collapse herds (Næss & Bårdsen 2010; 58 
Næss & Bårdsen 2013). 59 
Group living can lead to a social dilemma where rational actors might choose not to contribute to a 60 
common enterprise (i.e. defect) but still try to reap the benefits of other’s contributions, eventually 61 
leading to a breakdown in cooperation. Avoidance of defectors can allow cooperators to assort 62 
together, either through mobility (Aktipis 2011), severing social links (Wang et al. 2012) or choosing 63 
partners (Stiff & Van Vugt 2008). The ability to choose from a 'marketplace' (Noë & Hammerstein 64 
1994) of competing potential partners can lead individuals to act more cooperatively in relation to 65 
others, resulting in an escalation of 'competitive cooperation' (Barclay & Willer 2007). Individuals 66 
may direct cooperative behaviors to others based on their knowledge of the recipient’s reputation 67 
(indirect reciprocity (Nowak 2006)). In biological markets, being cooperative could act as an indicator 68 
of status, as can factors such as skill, prestige or experience. 69 
Once partners have been chosen, rewards (such as gifts) and punishment may be important 70 
mechanisms for maintaining cooperation through partner control (Trivers 1971; West et al. 2007). 71 
However, gift exchange might also function as a method of pooling risk in unpredictable 72 
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environments in order to benefit all social group members. For pastoralists, exchanging gifts of 73 
livestock has been theoretically shown to boost long-term herd survival (Aktipis et al. 2011). 74 
Predictions 75 
Previous work on Saami pastoralists has looked at how genetic relatedness and labor availability 76 
affect cooperation across districts, which are administrative clusters of herding groups (Næss et al. 77 
2010; Næss et al. 2012). We extend this to investigate the relative effects of kinship and cooperative 78 
group membership on gift giving behavior between individuals within a district. Saami pastoralists 79 
organize themselves into groups – composed of kin and non-kin – for the purposes of cooperative 80 
herding, their primary means of subsistence. Given the reliance on herding groups, we predict a 81 
strong cooperative bias towards fellow group members, regardless of whether or not the recipients 82 
are genetic relatives.  83 
However, this hypothesis does not imply that kinship will be unimportant. One manifestation of kin 84 
selection in humans may take the form of inter-g nerational resources flows from older to younger 85 
family members, especially from parents to children (Kaplan 1994). Thus, we predict that resources 86 
such as gifts would be given preferentially to younger people when they are given within families. 87 
We aim to quantify the relative effects of factors predicting cooperative behavior by conducting a 88 
culturally salient experimental gift game among Saami reindeer herders living in Finnmark, Northern 89 
Norway. Participants could choose between one and three other reindeer herders to receive a gift of 90 
money. In order to ensure the game had contextual relevance to participants, we framed the gifts in 91 
terms of how much gasoline they could be used to purchase, since gasoline is a valuable commodity 92 
for Saami pastoralists. 93 
Methods 94 
This research was approved by the University College London research ethics committee. 95 
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Study Area 96 
The term Saami describes a group of people indigenous to the areas that comprise northern 97 
Fennoscandia (Norway, Sweden and Finland), as well as the westernmost part of Russia. Today only 98 
a minority of Saami people subsist on reindeer pastoralism; as of 2013, there were 533 licensed 99 
reindeer herders (Norwegian: siidaandeler) living in Norway and 3,112 other Saami people 100 
connected to reindeer husbandry (Anonymous 2013). 101 
The siida is an important economic and cultural unit of cooperation and subsistence (Paine 1994). 102 
Membership is, for the most part, influenced by long-standing relationships between families, some 103 
of whom will be genealogically related. Traditionally, the siida was based on conjugal and sibling 104 
solidarity, which could be extended to include cousins and other affinal relatives of the same 105 
generation (Bergman et al. 2008). Unmarried people and unrelated wage laborers may also join 106 
siidas on a facultative basis. Therefore, siidas can include both kin and non-kin. 107 
People from different siidas can interact in a number of ways. With the adoption of snowmobiles 108 
and other vehicles as well as communication technologies, herders now live more sedentary lives: 109 
Members from several siidas live in the same towns for much of the year. In addition, herders from 110 
different siidas may help one another by splitting up mixed herds or finding lost reindeer. Conflicts 111 
may also arise, which has resulted in the destruction of fences separating the pasture areas of 112 
different siidas, among other issues. 113 
In general, herders belong to two siidas: summer and winter. Summer siidas are large groups of 114 
households whose reindeer graze on the coastal pastures and islands of Norway. The summer siida 115 
became a legal entity in 2007 and can be thought of akin to a corporation with elected boards of 116 
leaders. Before the legal consolidation of siidas, membership was more flexible and could change 117 
over time; of the herders in our study sample, only 1 person had moved summer siida within the 118 
past 15 years. Every year, summer siidas split into 1 or more smaller winter siidas whose herds graze 119 
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in the interior of the country (Paine 1994). Summer siidas are grouped into administrative regions 120 
defined by the government, known as districts (Næss et al. 2009). 121 
In the present study, we focus on a single district in Finnmark County – the northernmost and largest 122 
reindeer herding area in Norway (Figure 1). Our sample was formed of licensed herd owners within 123 
summer siidas. The Norwegian Government provides licenses to a subset of herders within each 124 
summer siida/district. These license owners are legally allowed to keep reindeer and the Norwegian 125 
Agriculture Agency (Landbruksdirektoratet) tracks the productivity of their herds over time. As of 126 
2013, there were 377 license owners in the county of Finnmark (Anonymous 2013). 127 
Saami herders face occupational stresses from predators, weather conditions, financial pressures, 128 
changing land tenures, conflicts, and ethnic discrimination (Bjerkli 2010; Hansen et al. 2010; Allard 129 
2011; Pape & Löffler 2012). A recent report found that the high levels of reindeer mortality observed 130 
in Finnmark might be due not to predation, as commonly believed, but rather overcrowding of 131 
reindeer and the poor condition of the animals (Tveraa et al. 2013). Conflicts can involve 132 
governments, industry (e.g., mineral extraction or logging companies), landowners, researchers, as 133 
well as other reindeer herders. Within the reindeer husbandry community, conflicts can arise over 134 
encroachment onto a rival siida’s pasture, theft of reindeer, and destruction of fences, among other 135 
things (Paine 1970). 136 
Siidas are also loci for collective action. Siida group members work together on maintenance 137 
activities, run slaughterhouses, and gathering herds into corrals so as to weigh and administer 138 
medicine to the animals, determine the number and quality of pregnant cows, and split herds by sex 139 
before seasonal migrations. Given the conflicts and cooperative behaviors described above, we 140 
would expect the siida to represent more than a decision-making body: rather, it would act as an 141 
important social unit. The focus of our study is the summer siida. 142 
Gift Game 143 
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In July and August 2013, the first author interviewed 30 licensed reindeer herders across all 9 144 
summer siidas in 1 district in Finnmark, Norway (Figure 1) with the help of a Saami field assistant. 145 
Participants were endowed with vouchers (see below) and were then asked to give these as 146 
anonymous gifts to other licensed herd owners in their district. Respondents were presented with a 147 
list of license owners in the district (collected by a combination of publically available contact 148 
information and snowball sampling, whereby one participant suggested other potential participants) 149 
coded with randomly generated ID numbers. Respondents read the ID numbers of their desired gift 150 
recipients to the field assistant. This procedure aimed to minimize experimenter bias, since the 151 
assistant was also a member of the district, although not a licensed herd owner. 152 
We gave players 3 vouchers, each representing 5 liters of gasoline. At the time, 1 liter of petrol cost 153 
approximately NOK 15 (US$ 2.54). Players could choose to give the vouchers to 1-3 other license 154 
owners – in multiples of 5 liters. They were not allowed to keep anything for themselves; they had to 155 
give the vouchers to at least 1 recipient. Players also gave reasons for their distribution of gifts. We 156 
coded these open answers into 1-3 keywords, blind to the giver’s name, siida and distribution of gifts 157 
(see Supplementary Methods). At the end of the experimental period, all recipients were given their 158 
rewards in the form of cash, since the vouchers were created for the purposes of this study and 159 
were not legal tender, although all gift decisions were framed in terms of liters of gasoline. 160 
Communication was not allowed within the parameters of the experiment. However, due to the 161 
vagaries of the herding lifestyle, we were unable to conduct all interviews within a sufficiently short 162 
time to rule out for the chance that herders did not communicate with one another. 163 
Experimental materials were translated into Norwegian by an independent person and back-164 
translated by the second author. The first and second authors agreed on the final translations. 165 
Norwegian and English materials are available on request. 166 
Kinship Data  167 
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Genealogical data were collected in May 2014 detailing how each license owner in the district (n = 168 
75) was related to one another. We linked license owners to their previously assigned ID numbers 169 
and calculated a coefficient of relatedness (rij) for each pair of herders (i, j). This resulted in a full 170 
kinship network of licensed herd owners in the target district. 171 
Herd Size Data 172 
Herd sizes held by individual license owners were collected from data published by the Norwegian 173 
Broadcasting Corporation (Norsk rikskringkasting AS; Aslaksen (2014)). We used the numbers of 174 
reindeer held by individuals in 2012 – the most recent data available. We were able to match herd 175 
sizes for 62 of the 75 people in our database, not achieving complete coverage due to changes in 176 
license owners between 2012 and our study period. Herd sizes were group-mean centered across 177 
the district. 178 
Statistical Analysis 179 
We fitted generalized estimating equation (GEE) models to all potential gift-giving dyads, where the 180 
egos were the 30 gift game participants and alters were the 75 licensed owners, giving 30 × (75 −181 
1) 	= 	2,220 possible dyads. The binary response variable in all models was whether or not a gift 182 
was given within a dyad. We present unstandardized and standardized estimates, where in the latter 183 
case, binary factors were mean-centered and continuous variables were standardized over 2 184 
standard deviations to allow estimates to be compared within models, following the 185 
recommendations of Gelman (2008) and Schielzeth (2010). 186 
GEE is a population-averaged approach that accounts for multiple observations of each ego by 187 
clustering standard errors. We specified an exchangeable working correlation matrix, which models 188 
the dependence of observations within clusters. GEE does not use full likelihood estimates, so we 189 
computed and compared the quasi-likelihood under the independence model information criterion 190 
(QIC) for model selection (Pan 2001). Note that we did not fit models containing the individual-level 191 
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predictors gathered from our questionnaires since doing so would have dramatically reduced the 192 
number of dyads in our analysis. 193 
Analyses were conducted in R 3.2.0 (R Core Team 2012). Details of packages and additional software 194 
used, as well as where to download archived data and analysis code, are available in the 195 
Supplementary Information. 196 
Results 197 
Description of the District and the Gift Network 198 
61 of the 75 herd owners in the district were male, with a median age of 53 (see Supplementary Fig. 199 
S1 for the age distribution and Table S1 for descriptive statistics). The median number of reindeer 200 
owned by herders in the district in 2012 was 456.5, ranging between 55 and 1,604 reindeer 201 
(Supplementary Fig. S2). The 30 herders interviewed gave 71 gifts to 43 people (Figure 2a), some of 202 
whom were also participants. Of the 71 gifts, 45 (63.4%) were given to members of the same 203 
summer siida. A significantly higher proportion of gifts were given within siidas (
 = 4.563,  =204 
0.033). The majority of gifts (59) were for 5 liters of gasoline and were given by 18 of the 30 people 205 
interviewed. 5 gifts, given by 5 separate individuals, were worth 10 liters, while 7 gifts, given by 7 206 
different people, were for 15 liters. 207 
The number of gifts received by individuals (in-degree) ranged from 0 to 7 (median = 1, mean = 0.95, 208 
standard deviation [SD] = 1.16). We do not report the number of gifts given (out-degree) or include 209 
it in the models since only the 30 people interviewed were able to give gifts. Gift givers received 210 
more gifts; that is, out-degree significantly correlated with in-degree (Pearson's product-moment 211 
correlation,  = 0.415,  < 0.001, 95%		[0.208, 0.587]). One outlier received 7 gifts totaling 50 212 
liters of gasoline – twice as much as the second most popular herder. The reasons given for his gifts 213 
fell on a wide spectrum, from "Deserves it" and "Good reindeer herder" to "Always empty of fuel". 214 
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Ten gifts (28.2%) were reciprocated (Figure 2b), despite communication not featuring in the 215 
experiment. Of the reciprocated gifts, only 1 was given to a member of another siida. In this case, 216 
both were males living in the same town who clearly had a history of working together based on 217 
their stated reasons for giving the gifts. Supplementary Table S2 shows descriptive statistics for the 218 
gift network. 219 
Siida leaders did not receive more gifts than others (Table 1). There was a significant sex difference 220 
between number of gifts received where males on average received more (Mann-Whitney test, 221 
 = 258.500,  = 0.015), although the sample contains substantially fewer females (4 of the 43 222 
herders who received gifts). 223 
Relatedness in the District 224 
The smallest two siidas (‘a’ and ‘f’ in Figure 3) were formed entirely of siblings and/or parents with 225 
children (rij = 0.5). These siidas contained, respectively, 2 and 3 licensed owners. As the number of 226 
members increases, there was no discernible trend in relatedness across the nine siidas. The mean 227 
relatedness across the district was rij  = 0.02 (i.e., between 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 cousins), whereas the grand 228 
mean of mean relatedness within siidas was rij = 0.19. Due to the small number of groups and their 229 
small sizes, we did not perform analyses grouped by individual siidas. 230 
Analysis of gift giving 231 
Table 2 shows the distribution of gifts, split by whether recipients were genetically related to the 232 
giver and/or belonged to the same siida. We calculated correlation coefficients between the 233 
networks of gifts, relatedness and siida membership (Supplementary Table S3). Summer siida 234 
membership correlated with genetic relatedness ( = 0.39,  ≪ 0.01, 95%		[0.35, 0.42]). The 235 
coefficient of relatedness between givers and receivers correlates with receiving a gift ( =236 
0.32,  ≪ 0.01, 95%		[0.29, 0.36]) and with siida membership 237 
( = 0.42,  ≪ 0.01, 95%		[0.38, 0.45]). 238 
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In the best-fitting GEE model (Table 3), belonging to the same summer siida as the other person in a 239 
dyad was the strongest predictor of gift-giving (standardized log odds = 1.875, S.E. = 0.447) 240 
compared to genetic relatedness (standardized log odds = 0.691, S.E. = 0.187). Note that these 241 
estimates are only biologically interpretable in their unstandardized form (Table 3). 242 
From the full set of candidate models, the model containing only a term for siida membership 243 
(model 5 in Supplementary Table S4) fitted the data better than the model containing only a term 244 
for relatedness (model 6 in Supplementary Table S4). Models with an interaction between 245 
relatedness and siida membership (models 3 and 4 in Supplementary Table S4) and models 246 
containing herd sizes for the potential giver and recipient (models 2 and 4 in Supplementary Table 247 
S4) did not provide a better fit compared to the model containing additive terms for relatedness and 248 
siida membership (Table 3; model 1 in Supplementary Table S4). 249 
We hypothesized that gifts would preferentially be given to younger herders within families (where 250 
gifts to younger herders are scored as a negative age difference). Contrary to expectations, gifts 251 
were not preferentially given to younger kin (
 = 0.78,  = 0.38; Table 4). Age also had no 252 
significant effect on the number of gifts received (Spearman's rank correlation, ρ = −0.235,  =253 
0.211; Figure 4).  254 
Why give? 255 
Table 5 lists the coded translations of all reasons for giving gifts (Supplementary Table S5 provides 256 
the full text). The most common category (n = 24) for giving a gift, regardless of kinship and siida 257 
membership, was current or future reciprocity. Thirteen gifts were given to recipients with good 258 
reputations. 259 
An interesting case is the gifts given to non-kin belonging to other siidas. Over half of these gifts 260 
were split between those with reputations of being a ‘good herder’ and young license owners who 261 
were newly established in reindeer husbandry. 262 
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Discussion 263 
Summer siidas are stable cooperative groups. Only 1 person of 30 interviewed had moved between 264 
summer siidas within the last 15 years. Belonging to the same summer siida was the stronger 265 
predictor for gift-giving compared to being genetically related (Table 3). Interactions between 266 
relatedness and siida membership (models 3 and 4 in Supplementary Table S4) did not provide a 267 
better fit to the data. Similarly, including the herd sizes for the potential gift giver and recipient did 268 
not improve the fit (models 2 and 4 in Supplementary Table S4). Siida membership may be 269 
important for this population if strategies that benefit direct fitness are optimal compared to those 270 
increasing indirect fitness. Alternatively, herders might receive inclusive fitness benefits by virtue of 271 
assorting into the same groups as kin, whereas cooperation with non-kin might need to be 272 
maintained via reward mechanisms such as gift giving. 273 
There was no preference for giving gifts to younger herders within families (Table 4 and Figure 4), 274 
contrary to our prediction derived from parental investment theory regarding the flow of resources 275 
down generations within families. The absence of this pattern is likely due to participants not 276 
viewing the gifts as resources to be invested in younger relatives. It should be noted that some close 277 
relatives (such as a son and heir) might be jointly herding with the herd owner and therefore not 278 
eligible to receive a gift as they are not yet a licensed herd owner themselves.  279 
Twenty-four of the 71 gifts (33.8%) were given for reasons related to existing reciprocal relationships 280 
or developing future relationships (Table 5). In addition, 10 gifts (28.2%) were reciprocated although 281 
the experimental setup did not allow communication between participants (Figure 2b). This form of 282 
direct reciprocity has been conceptualized as an important mechanism behind the evolution of 283 
cooperation (Trivers 1971; Nowak 2006). Our experiment did not explicitly account for either 284 
indirect (reputational) or direct reciprocity as mechanisms underlying cooperation; rather, we 285 
investigated the relative importance of kinship and social group membership in predicting gift giving. 286 
Membership of the same siida may imply multiple opportunities for reciprocation. 287 
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While the stated reasons for why participants gave particular gifts were ad hoc, we argue they 288 
provide valuable insight into behavior in the games. Thirteen of the 71 gifts (18.3%) were given to 289 
those with the reputation of being a ‘good herder’ (Table 5), something important to Saami 290 
pastoralists (Paine 1970). Gifts were not given preferentially to siida leaders (Table 2). In this study, 291 
we were not able to control for potential confounds such as prestige, skills, experience, etc. that may 292 
have biased gift giving behaviors, although we did control for herd size as a proxy of wealth. Given 293 
this indication that cultural factors such as reputation may be important mediators of cooperative 294 
behavior for Saami reindeer herders, future work could attempt to define measures of reputation 295 
and prestige that are meaningful to this population. One approach would be to ask herders, 296 
preferably in group interviews, to rank others by their experience, skill, history of good decisions, 297 
etc. These culturally derived measures could then be linked to quantitative measures of wealth and 298 
used to predict gift giving. 299 
Gifts in our study were small and anonymous, and communication between participants was not 300 
allowed. This makes it unlikely that costly signals, reputation or competitive altruism were driving 301 
the observed behaviors, although we were unable to test this formally. However, indirect reciprocity 302 
and competitive cooperation play important roles in human social groups, especially when 303 
cooperative behaviors are public (Barclay 2013; Sylwester & Roberts 2013). Our study investigated 304 
the factors underlying partner choice but did not look at mechanisms of partner control that might 305 
enforce or maintain cooperation. Future work should attempt to understand the relative importance 306 
of partner control compared with partner choice as well as the roles of indirect reciprocity, partner 307 
choice and direct reciprocity (especially reciprocity based on reputation, i.e., competitive 308 
cooperation) in real-world contexts. 309 
This work represents a first step towards quantifying the forms and diversity of cooperative 310 
strategies among Saami people. Saami pastoralists face many social and ecological challenges. 311 
Competition for access to winter pastures may explain herd accumulation as the only viable risk-312 
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reducing strategy, although the efficacy of this strategy may be limited by quotas on maximum herd 313 
size (Næss & Bårdsen 2010). This suggests the future of reindeer husbandry presents a collective 314 
action problem for the herders: one that may be solved from within the community without 315 
necessitating the privatization of pastures (Bjørklund 1990; Marin 2006; Hausner et al. 2012). At 316 
present, management policies seem to be designed to attain sustainability by targeting only 317 
individual reindeer owners (e.g. providing subsidies to increase slaughter rates), while disregarding 318 
the cooperative nature of reindeer pastoralism (Næss et al. 2012). Understanding the mechanisms 319 
of cooperation in this population will be an important task for its future viability.  320 
  321 
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Figure Legends 406 
Figure 1: Location of the study site, situated in the county of Finnmark, Norway (shown in blue). The 407 
study site was a single district (dashed ellipse and inset). The inset map shows the study site, with 408 
the black outline representing the district border and red outlines representing summer siida 409 
pasture boundaries. Pastures are labelled with the siida code used in this study. Note that siida 'd' 410 
has two pastures since it was two siidas at the time the map was drawn; it is now considered a single 411 
siida. Map credits are listed in the supplementary information. 412 
Figure 2: Gift networks showing license owners in the district (nodes) colored by siida membership 413 
for (a) the entire district and (b) reciprocated gifts only. Filled circles represent the 30 license owners 414 
interviewed for this study. Edges are gifts, where edge thickness corresponds to gift size (5, 10 or 15 415 
liters of gasoline) and color shows the siida from which the gift came. 416 
Figure 3: Relatedness within the 9 siidas. Points are the mean coefficients of relatedness between 417 
licensed herd owners within each siida. Error bars show standard deviation. Data are ordered, from 418 
left to right, in increasing group sizes (also shown within the data points). The grey dotted line shows 419 
the mean relatedness in the entire district (i.e. across all siidas); the red dotted line shows the grand 420 
mean (i.e. mean of the mean within-siida relatedness coefficients). 421 
Figure 4: Age differences between givers and receivers of gifts where the pair are (a) kin or (b) non-422 
kin. Positive values represent gifts given to older herders (brown bars) whereas negative values 423 
represent gifts to younger herders (blue bars). No gifts were given to herders of the same age. 424 
  425 
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Tables 426 
Table 1: Number of gifts received (In-degrees) split by whether the herder is on their siida’s leadership board or not. 427 
  In-degree 
Leader? N Median Mean SD 
Yes 18 1 1.28 1.02 
No 12 1 1.75 1.91 
Unknown 45 0 0.60 0.78 
 428 
  429 
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 430 
Table 2: Counts of people receiving a gift or not, split by whether they are genetic relatives and/or members of the same 431 
summer siida, for all possible dyads in the district. 432 
Same siida? Related? Received gift? % receiving 
gift No Yes 
Yes Yes 74 30 28.8% 
No 153 15 8.9% 
No Yes 88 3 3.3% 
No 1,834 23 1.2% 
 433 
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 435 
Table 3: Results from the best-fitting generalized estimating equation. Column 2 shows unstandardized log odds (S.E.); 436 
column 3 shows log odds (S.E.) standardized over 2 SD (Schielzeth 2010; Gelman 2008) so that the effect sizes can be 437 
directly compared. The predictors are the coefficient of relatedness, r, and a binary factor coding whether or not a dyad 438 
belongs to the same summer siida. The siida membership predictor most strongly predicts gift giving, although relatedness 439 
also has a positive effect. See Supplementary Table S4 for a comparison of all candidate models. 440 
Parameter Log odds (S.E.) Standardized log odds (S.E.) 
Intercept -4.178 (0.225) -3.868 (0.184) 
r 4.263 (1.152) 0.691 (0.187) 
Same siida? 1.875 (0.447) 1.875 (0.447) 
 441 
 442 
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Table 4: Number of gifts given to older or younger herders, split by whether or not the dyad were kin. 444 
Gift to… Older Younger Unknown 
… kin 19 13 1 
… non-kin 16 14 8 
 445 
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 447 
Table 5: Coded reasons for giving gifts, split by whether or not the recipient is a genetic relative and/or belongs to the same 448 
summer siida. 449 
 Reason category 
Kin in 
same siida 
Non-kin in 
same siida 
Kin in another 
siida 
Non-kin in 
another siida 
Total 
Good herders 3 2  8 13 
Young/new owners 1 1  5 7 
Current or future reciprocity 12 9 1 2 24 
Old friend    1 1 
Need help  1  1 2 
Deserving 2 1   3 
Lazy    3 3 
Selfish 1    1 
Family 7  2 2 11 
No reason given 4 1  1 6 
Total 30 15 3 23  
 450 
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